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ABSTRACT 
Security and profitability objectives are becoming more relevant for Chinese firms as they expand their 
business operations on the African continent, where the political environment often exposes the firms to 
high political risk. Political risk analysis is increasingly important as a way of identifying, assessing and 
addressing the issue of political risk. This study explores the political risk factors that may influence the 
operations of Chinese firms operating in Africa.  
Economic development, social development, political instability, corruption and political violence are 
host country factors that may shape the African political environment and foreign business firms’ 
exposure to political risk. Company-specific factors may have a negative or positive impact on the 
exposure of Chinese firms to the host country’s political risk environment in Africa.  
Firstly, the size, ownership and the relationship of the firm with the home government may influence a 
firm’s bargaining power in a host country. Large and diversified firms, especially Chinese state-owned 
enterprises in strategic sectors generally have more bargaining power than small firms. 
Secondly, company resources such as capital, experience and technical expertise may give a company a 
competitive advantage over other firms, especially when the host country lack in these areas.  
Thirdly, the political behaviour of firms such as partnership formation with the government may be 
beneficial to business operations. However, in unstable countries this may pose a risk to Chinese firms 
being targeted or losing contracts in cases of regime change.  
Fourthly, the more the country is economically dependent on the company or the home country, the 
more bargaining power the company has and it is less likely that the government would intervene. African 
countries may become more and more economically dependent on China as China-African trade relations 
expand and Chinese concessional loans become more relevant to African countries.  
Fifth, a firm’s reputational risk may be influenced by firm culture, its response to corporate social 
responsibility, environmental concerns and labour issues. Chinese firms generally have the reputation of 
having a more top-down business culture and not integrating corporate social responsibility, 
environmental concerns and labour issues into their business operations. 
Lastly, because an international business firm may be associated with its home country, the home-host 
country government relations may influence the firm’s political risk exposure. While this association may 
have negative consequences for Chinese firms in some cases, China’s increasing involvement in African 
diplomatic relations, peacekeeping missions and association with the African Union may add to China’s 
image in Africa as a responsible power sensitive to African security. 
The author was a research intern at the Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University, working on 
political risk and Chinese investments in Africa. This paper is based on part of her Master’s thesis in 
International Studies at the Stellenbosch University, which she obtained in March 2013. 
E-mail: gerdadutoit@mweb.co.za  
 
CCS discussion papers aim to contribute to the academic debate on China’s global rise and the 
consequences thereof for African development. The CCS therefore explicitly invites scholars from Africa, 
China, or elsewhere, to use this format for advanced papers that are ready for an initial publication, not 
least to obtain input from other colleagues in the field. Discussion papers should thus be seen as work in 
progress, exposed to (and ideally stimulating) policy-relevant discussion based on academic standards.  
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
China’s growing economic interest in Africa is evident from the presence of Chinese business activities on 
the continent in the form of trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), state-backed loans, attempts to 
establish special economic zones and the existence of construction contracts. While developed countries 
are currently constrained by the world economic downturn and sovereign debt problems, China has large 
foreign currency reserves and seems willing to invest in Africa, despite the unstable political environment 
of many African countries. Although the Chinese approaches towards political risk management are now 
more sophisticated than in the initial stage of their business internationalisation, Chinese investors 
generally seem less risk-averse than their Western counterparts (Moreira, 2013). The evacuation of more 
than 30 000 Chinese workers from Libya during the political turmoil in 2011 highlighted the need for 
Chinese companies to pay more attention to political risk in their investment decisions (Belligoli, 2012).  
This study explores the political risk factors that Chinese companies may face when operating in Africa. 
In the first section political risk and political risk analysis are conceptualised. The second section discusses 
the African political environment and the host country political risk factors that foreign business firms 
operating in Africa may be exposed to. The last section explores company-specific factors that may 
influence the way in which Chinese businesses are affected by political risk.  
1.1 CONCEPTUALISING POLITICAL RISK  
Political risk is one of the business risks that firms may encounter when operating in a foreign country. 
The conceptualisation of political risk evolved since the 1960s and 1970s when expropriation was the key 
business risk associated with the politics of a host country. Indeed, the nature of political risk has changed 
as the world is more integrated and new political actors have influence in the global political economic 
environment. Today political risk is a “highly complex and multidimensional phenomenon”, as Jakobsen 
(2010:482) argues. Political risk may include amongst others international wars, economic sanctions, 
terrorism, government instability, state failure, creeping expropriation, breaches of contract, repatriation 
restrictions or subtle discrimination (Moreira, 2013:133). 
While certain political events come as a surprise, for Fitzpatrick (1983:251), political risk is a process 
rather than a sudden event. This view is shared by Robock (1971:11), who argues that risk is not static 
and can change over time, as well as Sethi and Luther (1986:62), who refer to political risk as a “gradual 
event such as ideological changes”. Van Wyk (2010:115) also refers to “risk development” and thereby 
implies a process. While major political changes as a result of events such as elections, revolts or wars may 
pose political risk to firms, Bremmer and Keat (2009:4) emphasise that the collective impact of smaller 
events should not be ignored. For example, corrupt behaviour over time can have a major influence on a 
country’s political stability, and in turn may have negative consequences for business operations in that 
country. 
Business risk is about the likelihood that an event or action may occur and have an impact on the 
business (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:11). When considering the impact of the political event or process on 
the company, consideration should be given to various goals of the business. Because investors or lenders 
expect a return on their investments, and managers or employees expect business operations to continue, 
the main goal of a business is profitability as a measure of a business’s performance (Van Wyk, 2010:112). 
However, businesses also have other goals such as strategic value, job and physical security of personnel, 
infrastructure security and the long-term survival of the business, all of which could be influenced by 
political events (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:11). While risk is usually associated with negative outcomes, Alon 
and Herbert (2009:130), argue that political risk is a neutral phenomenon. They point out that political 
risk can have positive and/or negative outcomes for different entities and therefore international firms 
should safeguard against negative risk factors, but should also identify and exploit politically based 
opportunities (Alon & Herbert, 2009:130). Kobrin (1979:67) makes the point that not all political events 
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or conditions that have negative connotations for one firm will necessarily have negative consequences 
for all international businesses in all situations. Frynas and Mellahi (2003:548) illustrate this by the 
example of the Nigerian civil war from 1967-1970 that disrupted the onshore oil production activities of 
foreign oil companies in Nigeria, but had a positive effect on oil companies that exploited the civil war by 
expanding their offshore oil production during the time of political instability. It is therefore not only the 
negative implications of risks that should be highlighted, but through risk analysis business opportunities 
can also be identified where “risk can result in gains, even if there is a probability of losses” (Van der Lugt 
& Hamblin, 2011:25). Van der Lugt and Hamblin (2011:25) argue that Chinese companies operating in 
Africa have this perspective of risk that can result in gains, and the idea of opportunities as the positive 
side of risk is “expressed in the Chinese character for ‘crisis’, which contains both the word ‘chaos’ and 
opportunity’.” 
As Jakobsen (2010:482) argues, political risk is a multidimensional phenomenon. Brink (2004:25) 
emphasises the interrelationship of factors that can affect the business and investment climates, while 
Bremmer and Keat (2009:7) mention that one form of risk can create other forms of risk. For example, 
macroeconomic trends can influence political risk on the one hand, and on the other hand political 
decisions can have economic consequences that may impact on business operations (Bremmer & Keat, 
2009:9). Howell and Chaddick (1994:1) also mention the social dimension of the political environment, 
where social conditions may have political consequences. Furthermore, Alon and Martin (1998:11) argue 
that the sources of political risk are not limited to the host country, but also imply factors that originate 
from the home country environment, the international environment and the global environment. For 
example, the Canadian oil company, Talisman, withdrew from Sudan in 2003 after pressure from human 
rights activists in Canada and the United States of America (US) because of alleged human rights abuses 
during the Sudanese civil war (Kobrin, 2004:428). Stopford and Strange (1991:1) argue that firms and 
governments are mutually interdependent in a globalised world, as governments compete to attract FDI 
and firms become dependent on governments as they compete with other firms across national borders. 
Other than governments, Jakobsen (2010:482) and El Kattab, Anchor and Davies (2007) also add other 
political actors such as terrorists, activists, rebel groups or stakeholders as a source of political risk.  
From the discussion, for the purposes of this paper, political risk is broadly defined as: 
the risk that political processes or events influenced by various actors and circumstances or factors may have an 
impact on an international company’s goals, operations, assets or financial condition.  
Scholars such as Robock (1971), Simon (1982), Frynas and Mellahi (2003), Alon and Herbert (2009) and 
Baas (2010), emphasise the macro and micro dimension of political risk. While macro political risk refers 
to the dimension of political risk that will affect all companies and all industries operating in the host 
country or in a certain geographic region, micro-political risk is firm-specific, meaning that it affects only 
a single firm or a select group of companies or business activities (Alon & Herbert, 2009:129). Alon, 
Gurumoorthy, Mitchell and Steen (2006:625) give the example of potential war that would have a major 
influence on an oil-producing company, while the balance of payments situation in a country would have 
a major impact on risk for the banking industry. Frynas and Mellahi (2003:541,544) argue that within the 
same industry different firms that are exposed to the same political event or environment can be affected 
differently because of the specific firm’s strategic capabilities and resources such as its technical abilities, a 
firm’s high-level government connections or historical advantage. Micro political risk is therefore 
discriminative towards certain companies, either because of the industry in which the company operates 
or because of other characteristics and factors attached to specific companies. Alon and Herbert 
(2009:129) make the point that micro political risk is not independent from macro political risk as micro 
risk also originates from internal and external as well as economic, societal and governmental forces, but 
that some enterprises are more likely than others to be affected by certain macro political risks. Frynas 
and Mellahi (2003:541) further argue that international firms are not merely “passive bystanders” 
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influenced by the political environment in which they operate, but they can be active actors in shaping 
that environment or in exploiting it for their own benefit (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:541,562). Depending 
on the resources of the company, political risk is a risk that can be managed in such a way that the impact 
on the business is mitigated. However, in order to manage political risk, political risk must be assessed, 
for example by way of a political risk analysis. 
1.2 POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS AND THE AIM OF THIS STUDY 
The purpose of political risk analysis is to provide information on the nature and level of political risk for 
investors on which they can base decisions about their investments and business operations, and to 
manage the political risk in such a way that the negative effect on the business is mitigated. Risk 
assessments assist the investor in weighing up the opportunities of high returns against potential losses 
(Brink, 2004:148). Political risk analysis is grounded in problem-solving and decision-making theory, 
“generally assumed to be a theory underlying rational decision-making under uncertainty” (Brink, 
2004:30). For Venter (1999:1), the principle of reasoned and defensible decision-making is that a 
“decision-maker should anticipate future events, decide what measure of control is possible over those 
events and make a choice from those events that will produce a preferred outcome.” The analysis of 
political risk is a tool that investors can use to make reasoned and defensible decisions regarding 
investments (Venter, 1999:1). By conducting political risk analyses, investors can reduce uncertainties 
about the future and will be in a better position to make rational choices about their operations in the 
foreign country.  
A clear understanding of all factors and its indicators that can have an influence on political risk is 
necessary to conduct a reliable and purposeful political risk analysis. Although there are different methods 
of political risk analysis, Kobrin (1978:114) emphasises that such an analysis requires a systematic 
evaluation of political risk where possible political risk events are identified and the probability as well as 
the consequences for the investor assessed. Furthermore, political risk analysis should be done on a 
regular basis as new information might lead to new forecasts (Hough, 2008:2). A distinction should be 
made between predicting and forecasting future political events that may affect the investor. While it is 
not possible to accurately predict political risk, political risk can be forecasted based on evidence such as 
scientific theories and empirical evidence that support the forecast (Brink, 2004:27). A forecast is the 
probability that a political event might cause losses for the investor in the future (Brink, 2004:27). 
Bremmer and Keat (2009:23) are of the opinion that through political risk analysis it is even possible to 
identify the risk of events that have a low probability of happening, but that would have a high impact on 
investors, like the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. However, Brink (2004:28) points out that even the 
most sophisticated forecasting models and sources of information have limitations and therefore it is not 
possible to have absolutely accurate forecasts. Although political risk events cannot be predicted, they can 
be forecasted on the basis of political risk analysis. The validity and the reliability of the forecast will 
depend on the quality of the political risk analysis that in turn is influenced by aspects such as the 
methodology and the quality of the data used. For political risk analysis to be valid and to gain scientific 
recognition, Simon (1984:124) argues that the procedures followed should be done in a systematic way 
using models that are reliable. There are many models available for political risk analysis, but 
methodological problems can be encountered as some models are quantitative and others are qualitative 
in nature. It is therefore important to consider the attributes of qualitative and quantitative methods of 
political risk analysis.  
The main advantage of a qualitative approach is that such an approach looks at the political situation and 
risk factors in context. A specific situation can be analysed in context and a problem-solving assessment 
can be applied. For example scenario analysis will help the business firm to work towards a specific 
solution to the specific problem that the firm faces (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:24). A wider range of 
information would be gathered on the specific situation that might not be included in a quantitative 
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model (Frei & Ruloff, 1988:6). However, promoters of quantitative approaches argue that qualitative 
analysis could be too subjective (Brewer, 1981:9). On the other hand, Frei and Ruloff (1988:7, 9) argue 
that subjectivity is also a limitation in quantitative methods, as quantitative methods are still based on 
assumptions and judgments made by analysts. For Brink (2004:21), the quantitative model has the 
advantage of providing a calculated result in numerical terms for political risk, and therefore it can be 
used effectively in the management of the political risk. Furthermore, a quantitative approach can 
enhance the ability to compare political risk assessments (Brink, 2004:21). An investor can evaluate two 
investments on the basis of the same models and come to a conclusion as to which investment is the best. 
However, Brewer (1981:8) warns that caution should be taken not to totally disregard context and 
extrapolate historical situations to the future. Brewer (1981:8) uses the example of the Iranian war where 
the past stability of an authoritarian regime did not mean that the future would be stable. Brewer (1981:9) 
further points out that the fact that the analysis is quantitative does not mean that the political risk 
analysis can be successfully incorporated with financial risk in the overall investment risk. Bremmer and 
Keat (2009:5, 9) also emphasise that political risk is hard to quantify because of the complexity and 
interrelationship of the sources of political risk events. They use the example of the difficulty in 
calculating the cumulative losses incurred as a result of the 9/11 terrorists attack in the US (Bremmer & 
Keat, 2009:23). Hough (2008:11) makes the point that numerical risk analysis is of no value without being 
complemented by qualitative assessments and proper explanations of the conclusion of the analyst.  
Brink (2004:40) emphasises other problems with regards to the methodology used in political risk models, 
such as the fact that political risk factors from different levels of analysis are included in the same model. 
Brink (2004:40) warns against ecological and individualistic fallacies. Ecological fallacies refer to the mistake 
made to apply broad data on the ecological level to individual cases that can lead to false assumptions 
about a specific case. The individualistic fallacy on the other hand refers to the mistake to apply an 
observation that was done on an individual level incorrectly to the generalised level. A political risk 
indicator that implies a high risk for a certain business project will not necessarily be a high risk for other 
projects (Brink, 2004:40). To contribute to the objectiveness of the political risk analysis, an objective 
analytical framework should be used that is developed in accordance with a theoretical grounding 
(Robock, 1971:6; Kobrin, 1979:68). Kobrin (1978:120) argues that the use of mathematical models does 
not necessarily contribute to objectivity. Objectivity is rather reached by a better understanding of the 
political process and the operations of the firm. For example, Bremmer and Keat (2009:2) argue that the 
power dynamics of Chinese politics cannot be understood or studied in the same way as Saudi Arabia 
where politics is predominantly a family matter. Frei and Ruloff (1988:6) suggest that the qualitative 
methods should not be abandoned, but that they could be used in conjunction with quantitative methods 
because of the importance of context. Even in Brink’s (2004) model that seems quantitative, the mixed 
method approach is used.  
The aim of the study is not to develop a specific political risk model for Chinese companies operating in 
Africa, but rather to identify and explore important political risk factors that may influence their political 
risk exposure. These factors could be incorporated in a political risk model and considered in a political 
risk analysis. An approach will be followed in line with scholars from the micro analysis school of thought 
such as Baas (2010), Alon and Herbert (2009) and Boshoff (2010) that differentiate between macro and 
micro political risk factors. The model developed by Baas (2010) proposes a country level analysis and an 
industry-project analysis for specific political risks identified. Alon and Herbert’s (2009) micro political 
risk model considers factors from internal sources, external sources and firm-related factors. Their model 
should be used in conjunction with a macro political risk model. Boshoff‘s (2010) industry-specific 
political risk model for the oil and gas industry follows a two-stage analysis where host country political 
risk factors, including political, economic, societal and petroleum factors, are considered in the first stage, 
and company and international political risk factors in the second stage. As this paper focuses on all 
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investments in Africa by Chinese companies and not on a specific industry, the factors considered are 
limited to host country political risk factors and company-specific political risk factors.  
2. POLITICAL RISK FACTORS 
2.1 HOST COUNTRY POLITICAL RISK FACTORS  
Chinese corporations have investments and operations in most African countries in different industries 
such as banking, oil and other mining activities, construction and tele-communication. With 54 countries 
that vary in terms of political and economic development, history and culture, Africa is not a 
homogenous continent. Chinese businesses may therefore be exposed to different levels of political risk 
in different countries. However, there are some features that may be present in different degrees that 
shape the economic, social and political landscape of many African countries and could contribute to 
higher political risk levels. Although most African economies had positive real growth rates over the last 
decade (African Economic Outlook, 2013), the economies of many African countries are still 
underdeveloped and characterised by a weak private sector and heavy reliance on natural resources 
(Wombolt & Mattout, 2012; Games, 2011). Further, despite a growing middle class, many African 
societies suffer from extreme poverty and poor social development and education levels. Although most 
African countries seem to have – in principle – accepted multi-party politics, the political landscape of 
many countries is still shaped by political instability, corruption and weak state institutions, as well as 
political violence (Kuo, 2012a; Shen, 2013; Games, 2011; Saferworld, 2011). Political risk factors to 
consider include economic development, social development, corruption, political instability and political 
violence. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Economic growth is an important indicator of economic activity in a country, but growth without 
economic development, for example through economic diversification in conjunction with employment 
growth and infrastructure development, may indicate inadequate government measures for wealth 
distribution. The lack of economic development may also result in an unstable local currency, balance of 
payments and trade deficits and high inflation, making the cost of living high, which in turn may have 
political consequences for internal or social instability (Alon & Herbert, 2009:134). When the population 
of a country does not share in the benefits of economic growth and material living conditions do not 
improve, dissatisfaction with their situation may contribute to political grievances that may ultimately 
result in political instability or violence, increasing the political risk for foreign firms operating in the 
country. Further, in countries where the domestic tax base is limited, foreign companies may be 
specifically targeted to fill the government revenue gap. Currency instability may further affect the cost 
structure of a firm and consequently its profitability (Alon & Herbert, 2009:134). 
Most African countries, especially resource rich countries, experienced economic growth since the mid-
1990s as macroeconomic policies improved, debts reduced and countries increasingly received 
investments and foreign aid (Punam, Christiansen, Angwafo, Buitano, Dennis, Korman, Sanoh & Ye, 
2013:13). As the structure of many African economies is based on exporting raw materials, the growing 
interest in Africa’s natural resources and high commodity prices allowed countries to become integrated 
into the world economy (Cheung, De Haan, Qian & Yu, 2012). However, despite the growing African 
consumer market and increased levels of agricultural activity, the continent’s economic growth is still led 
by natural resources (Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), 2012). An overdependence on resource income 
in many countries, for example Angola, Nigeria, Zambia and Sudan, make these economies extremely 
vulnerable to price changes in one commodity, shocks in the world economy, and domestic insecurities 
(Punam et al, 2013:14; Aon, 2013). For example, Sudan’s extreme dependence on oil revenue meant that 
the country lost a significant part of its income since South Sudan’s secession in 2011, as most of the oil 
fields are on South Sudanese territory. Without foreign currency and government revenue, the 
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government austerity measures and grievances of hyperinflation and high fuel prices led to political 
protests in Khartoum and other Sudanese regions during June and July 2012 (Reeves, 2012).  
Despite economic growth, many African economies are characterised by poor economic development 
with high inequality and unemployment rates, food insecurity and inadequate transport and power 
infrastructure development (Punam et al, 2013:5,6; Aon, 2013). China may play a role in Africa’s 
economic development through investment, trade and infrastructure development, but as Punam et al 
(2013:9) mention, overdependence on China’s demand for its natural resources may make some African 
countries vulnerable to a downturn in China’s economy, not unlike the effects of fragile economic 
conditions in the Eurozone and the US. If investments in Africa do not contribute to economic 
development that benefit the population of a country, investors may face increased levels of political risk.  
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
The development of human resources remains one of the main challenges in Africa. Although economic 
growth in most African countries contributed to human development growth over the last few decades, 
many countries continue to lag behind the rest of the world. According to the Human Development 
Report (2013) sub-Saharan countries have the lowest human development levels in the world, 34 African 
countries are classified as low human development levels and only a few countries, such as Mauritius, 
Libya and Algeria, have high levels of human development. In countries with low human development 
levels, investors may be at risk of skills shortages in their labour force, which is likely to impact negatively 
on productivity. This may especially be the case in countries where African governments try to promote 
the transfer of skills by foreign investors by pressurising investors to employ local people (Games, 2011). 
Further, economic growth in many African countries contributed to rapid urbanisation, in many cases 
without proper planning (EIU, 2012). Inadequate social development, for example in terms of access to 
proper housing, health and transport facilities, may spur social unrest and political opposition against 
inefficient governments.  
POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
Political instability may expose business firms to the risk of decisions made by new governments or new 
factions within the government, which might impact the firm’s ability to continue its operations or 
influence its profitability. African countries progressed over the last few decades in terms of multi-party 
systems and more or less competitive elections, but governments are not necessarily stable and efficient 
(EIU, 2012). Authoritarianism was challenged in North Africa since the 2011 Arab Spring and recent 
coups, for example in Niger, Mali and Central African Republic, as well as attempted, but failed, coups, 
for example in Madagascar, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Ivory Coast demonstrated the 
discontentment with governments. However, new governments in these countries are not necessarily 
stable and may face challenges in creating effective and efficient political and economic institutions (Aon, 
2013). Business firms therefore may face risks such as uncertain legal and regulatory systems, new 
contract specifications, sovereign debt problems or political interference (Aon, 2013).  
CORRUPTION AND WEAK STATE INSTITUTIONS 
Despite efforts in a number of countries and in the African Union (AU) to eliminate corruption, 
government corruption remains a major problem in many African countries, where the patronage system 
is integrated into weak state institutions and a large proportion of economic activity takes place in the 
informal sector (Wombolt & Mattout 2012). As Lacher (2012:7,20) argues, the system of clientelism 
impedes the development of effective state structures, which in turn creates an uncertain business 
environment. Without strong institutions, company representatives have to rely on individuals in the 
clientelist system for certain decisions to be taken. This may become a problem for business when new 
officials, especially on minister level are appointed in new governments (Games, 2011). Also, in countries 
with a weak tax system, foreign companies may be at risk of ad hoc treatment (Aon, 2013). Further, 
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unreliable legal systems may put firms at risk of contract violations, changes in laws (including some 
attempts to change legislation in retrospect) and regulations and uncertain property rights (Games, 2011; 
Aon, 2013).  
Although there is the perception that Chinese firms’ business practices are not concerned with corruption 
to the same degree as their Western counterparts, Shen’s (2013) study shows that for business planning, 
Chinese investors prefer to have consistency in policies and clarity of laws and regulations. Chinese firms 
are also pressurised by the Chinese government with broad legislation that criminalise bribery of officials 
from foreign governments and international organisations (Matisoff, 2012; Wombolt & Mattout, 2012). 
Chinese companies can therefore not ignore the risk that corruption in African countries pose on their 
business activities.  
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
Political violence in Africa, whether in the form of international war, internal conflict, post-conflict 
situations, political uprisings, social unrest, violent state actions or terrorism, is an increasing concern for 
Chinese business operations, especially put into the limelight of attention by the major evacuation effort 
of Chinese nationals during the Libyan crisis in 2011. Besides the costs of the evacuation, Chinese 
companies in Libya incurred losses in terms of the disruption of employment, operations and trade, 
attacks and looting of the construction sites, compensation claims and re-employment of returned 
workers (Belligoli, 2012; Zhang & Wei, 2012). Other recent examples of political violence in Africa 
include terrorist activities in Algeria, where a natural gas plant was attacked in January 2013 and foreign 
workers were taken hostage, as well as a coup in Mali, followed by the French military deployment (Aon, 
2013). Violent conflict between Sudanese and South Sudanese armies in 2012 forced oil companies 
operating in Sudan to discontinue their operations (United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2012:4). In 
Central African Republic political violence continues to threaten the lives of civilians after a coup by the 
Seleka rebel alliance (Reliefweb, 2013). Nigeria also suffers from outbreaks of political violence, ethnic 
tensions, Islamic militant insurgency by Boko Haram and terrorist attacks undermine the security 
situation in the country (Aon, 2013; Control Risks, 2013).  
Apart from the on-going conflict, many African states are in post-conflict situations, where security 
remains a concern. In a post-conflict environment, state and political institutions are often weak and 
unable to incorporate former rebels into the state security forces. This unemployment of soldiers and the 
proliferation of arms may create security concerns such as crime, banditry and extremist activities 
(Games, 2011; Aon, 2013).  
Kuo (2012a) argues that although African security is not one of Beijing’s major concerns, increased 
Chinese investment on the continent also increased Chinese exposure to African insecurity. China is 
therefore not in a position to ignore the African security situation. As part of the non-interference policy, 
China originally had the approach of contributing to African peace and security through economic 
development of post-conflict countries, rather than getting involved in political missions. However, 
Saferworld (2011) and Belligoli (2012) argue that although economic assistance is important, it should not 
be seen as an alternative for working directly with the conflict and China should get more involved in 
conflict resolution, as economic, social and political stability are all linked. While China’s official foreign 
policy is still one of non-interference in the politics of African countries, Beijing is increasingly engaged in 
diplomatic relations and peacekeeping missions, in the form of financial support and personnel 
contributions (Kuo, 2012a; International Crisis Group (ICG), 2009). According to Saferworld (2011) 
China is the largest contributor of troops amongst the five permanent members of the UNSC, and the 
majority of its troops are stationed in Africa as military observers, civilian policy, infrastructure, and 
medical and logistical support units. However, as ICG (2009) argues, there is a lot of scope for more 
engagement as China has the capacity in terms of uniformed personnel to make a huge contribution.  
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2.2 COMPANY-SPECIFIC POLITICAL RISK FACTORS  
Chinese firms operating in Africa may be exposed to host country political risk factors, but there are 
some micro political risk factors that may influence the way in which Chinese firms are affected by 
political events in the host country such as war or regime change. As argued by Alon and Herbert (2009), 
Kobrin (1979) and Frynas and Mellahi (2003), political risk is company or project specific. However, 
Chinese companies operating in Africa are not a homogenous group. Chinese firms not only operate in 
different African industries, but they also differ in size, in shareholding, management styles and in the 
level of international integration – and are competing with each other in many instances. Factors that may 
influence their political risk exposure in Africa may include: size, ownership and relationship of the firm 
with the home government; firm resources such as capital, experience and technical expertise; political 
behaviour of the firm; the degree of economic dependence on the firm or the home country; reputation 
of the company in terms of company culture, corporate social responsibility (CSR), environmental 
concerns and labour issues; and home-host country government relations.  
SIZE, OWNERSHIP AND RELATIONSHIP WITH HOME GOVERNMENT 
The size of a company in terms of assets, the company’s degree of internationalisation and whether the 
company is privately or state-owned may impact on an enterprise’s political risk exposure (Al Kattab et al, 
2007). For example, large firms may be a target for host countries in terms of ad hoc taxes or tariffs. On 
the other hand, large firms may be more able than small firms to invest in business opportunities with 
higher risk, as they can afford initial losses. Large firms may also be more diversified and less dependent 
on the host country’s market or supplies. Alon and Herbert (2009:134) argue that a firm’s dependence on 
the market of the host country decreases its bargaining power relative to the host country government, 
raising the risk of adverse government regulation. On the other hand, a host country government has less 
power over the global activities of diversified firms with alternative sources of revenue (Alon & Herbert, 
2009:135). While many Chinese companies in different industries operate in Africa, Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) mostly focus on large projects in the natural resource and infrastructure sectors, 
medium sized privately owned Chinese companies generally invest in the manufacturing, 
telecommunication and wholesale trade sectors, and small private Chinese firms mostly own 
manufacturing and retail enterprises (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2009; Sanfilippo, 2010).  
China’s ”going out” policy encouraged SOEs since 2002 to invest strategically abroad in natural 
resources, new markets and new technologies and to create globally competitive multinationals to 
facilitate Chinese integration into the world economic order (Deng, 2009:76). In some cases, Africa 
served as a training ground for companies to gain experience in operating on the global stage, for example 
the investment in the Chambishi copper mines in Zambia at a time when the mines were judged 
unprofitable (Crabtree, 2008). The internationalisation of Chinese SOEs was promoted and secured them 
state support with the relaxation of foreign currency controls, subsidies and favourable financing through 
the state-owned financial institutions such as Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank) and the 
China Development Bank (CDB) (Moreira, 2013). As part of the process of transforming the Chinese 
SOEs into integrated modern market-oriented multinational corporations (MNCs), the corporations or 
their subsidiaries were listed on the world’s stock exchanges in order to improve their efficiency and 
profitability (Liou, 2009:675). Although these companies are listed, the majority of their shares are still 
held by the state (Deng, 2007:73). The State Asset Supervision and Administrative Commission (SASAC) 
has authority over the management of overseas assets of the top 50 Chinese SOEs in strategic sectors that 
is crucial for China’s national economy and security, such as oil, defence, power and telecommunication 
(Matisoff, 2012; Van der Lugt & Hamblin, 2011:38). It should however be taken into account that China 
is no longer a monolithic block that dictates the investment decisions of SOEs, because apart from 
SASAC, various state institutions such as the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs (MFA) are involved in (and compete with each other over) the management and 
regulation of Chinese FDI (Jiang, 2009:603; Corkin, 2011:67).  
Liou (2009:683) argues that this bureaucratic fragmentation has weakened the central state’s control over 
the corporations’ decisions because of the conflicting goals of the bureaucratic institutions. Jiang 
(2009:603) and Liou (2009:673) argue that the relationship between the Chinese state and the SOEs has 
changed with economic reforms and SOE managers have become more profit-oriented in their 
investment decision-making abroad. However, Shambaugh (2012) argues that Chinese firms still have a 
politicised nature as Communist Party members are often embedded within firm management, and 
although they can make decisions independent from the state, this may influence their motives. 
According to Morck, Yeung and Zhao (2008:347), these executive positions are often seen as a step in the 
political careers of the individuals. It is for this reason that Kolstad and Wigg (2009:6) suggest that 
alongside commercial objectives of profit-maximising, the investment decisions of Chinese SOEs also 
reflect political objectives such as the promotion of domestic development, regime survival, social 
stability, the support of Chinese foreign policy or host country development. It therefore seems that 
despite being market-oriented MNCs, decisions made by Chinese SOEs still somewhat reflect dual 
objectives, in other words, profit-maximising and political goals. The relationship of the company with 
the Chinese government and the support they get from Beijing may therefore influence their decision-
making and attitude towards risk taking.  
Private firms on the other hand are more independent from the government and they invest in Africa in 
search of better profit and business expansion opportunities (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2009). While large 
private firms also have the benefit that SOEs have of cheaper and longer-term finance and therefore have 
an advantage towards their Western counterparts, SOEs still have more government support than private 
firms (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2009). However, while this influence from government may be used as a tool 
by SOEs to mitigate risks, it is not necessarily an advantage in terms of reasonable decision-making. For 
example, in Shen’s (2013) study one of the SOEs in Nigeria could not make a business decision based on 
rational choice to leave the country after significant delays in construction and financial difficulties caused 
huge losses, as the project was based on a high-level government-to-government agreement.  
FIRM RESOURCES  
Frynas and Mellahi (2003) argue that a firm’s resources may give them a competitive advantage (or 
disadvantage) that may influence the way they are affected by political events in the host country. For 
example, firms with experience in operating in countries with political violence may develop efficient 
security measures in order to mitigate the effects of the political violence, giving them an advantage over 
competitors. Other firm resources include capital and technical expertise. For example, a firm with access 
to finance capital may be able to supply its own power or transport infrastructure in countries with weak 
government and state institutions and a lack of public services. Also, technical expertise that a firm may 
have may allow them to enter a niche market in a country despite an unstable government (Alon & 
Herbert, 2009:134). China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), for instance, had an advantage in 
the Sudanese oil industry because of their technical experience gained in China. CNPC originally focused 
on upstream activities in China and had experience in difficult exploration and production environments. 
Where other companies failed, CNPC discovered oil in the Melut Basin in Sudan because of special 
developed techniques to explore in passive rift and under-explored basins. 
While their access to finance capital may give a competitive advantage for many Chinese firms, especially 
the SOEs and large private firms, Chinese firms may have a disadvantage because of a lack of experience 
and technical expertise in operations abroad. Chinese firms are latecomers as investors in Africa and 
lacked initial experience in overseas operations (Moreira, 2013). According to Shambaugh (2012), the 
majority of Chinese firms do not develop business plans and strategies when they expand their business 
operations abroad, and their business decisions are frequently changed. Shambaugh (2012) is of the 
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opinion that very few Chinese firms besides the large national oil corporations (NOCs) have the ability 
and experience to operate globally. One of the main shortcomings is the lack of knowledge about the 
legal and regulatory environment of foreign countries they operate in (Shambaugh, 2012), a situation that 
may increase their exposure to political risk. However, Moreira (2013) point out that in the oil and gas 
industry, Chinese firms have managed and mitigated this risk with a strategy of entering into joint 
ventures with governments and strategic investors. In Sudan for example, CNPC joined the Greater Nile 
Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) and Petrodar consortiums with Petronas from Malaysia, Oil 
and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh from India and Sudapet from Sudan as partners (Moreira, 
2013). Moreira’s (2013) study further suggests that mergers and acquisitions are increasingly an 
investment strategy for Chinese NOCs to mitigate their risks of operating in a foreign country without 
experience. This has particularly been the case since their access to finance gave Chinese firms many 
buying opportunities after the 2008 financial crisis (Moreira, 2013). For example, with the acquisitions of 
Addax in 2009 by Sinopec, and Nexen in 2013 by China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), 
the Chinese firms gained access to the West African oil industry where these firms were established and 
already had large presence (Moreira, 2013). Mergers and acquisitions are however not limited to the oil 
and gas entry, but may also mitigate the political risk exposure for Chinese firms in other industries. This 
was arguably the case with the acquisition of a 20 per cent stake in the South African Standard Bank by 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) in 2007. The transaction gave a Chinese enterprise 
access to the African banking sector with an established client base and experience in operating in the 
African political environment. In this way ICBC may gain experience and operate in Africa with less 
exposure to political risk than establishing a new business.  
POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE FIRM 
A business firm’s political behaviour may give the firm a competitive advantage and arbitrage and leverage 
options that may influence their exposure to political risks (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994:126). Political 
behaviour may include dealings with governments, compliance with the rules of the government, 
partnership formation with the government or contributions to governments (Boddewyn & Brewer, 
1994:128,130; Keillor, Wilkinson & Owens, 2005:629). During the process of internationalisation, 
CNPC’s political behaviour focused on developing good relations with political elites as a strategy to 
mitigate the impact of its exposure to political risk (Moreira, 2013). However, Moreira (2013) argues that 
this strategy is not always a reliable political risk management tool and may become a competitive 
disadvantage rather than an advantage when there is a change in the political elite, especially in an 
unstable political environment where state institutions are weak. Moreira (2013) refers to Libya as a case 
in point, where CNPC had a strong relationship with the Libyan government since 2002, but after the 
regime change in 2011 their investments were at risk because of mistrust by the new government. 
Members of the Libyan opposition against the regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi attacked Chinese workers 
and infrastructure projects, and The Great Wall Drilling Co, a subsidiary of CNPC, had to cancel several 
projects in 2011 (Moreira, 2013). Although legal contracts are honoured by the new government (Moreira, 
2013), Control Risk (2013) argues that mistrust over companies’ previous relationships with the Qaddafi 
regime may pose continued reputation risk for international investors.  
DEGREE OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE  
The economic contribution of the firm to the host country may influence the firm’s exposure to political 
risk. For Brink (2004:181) this is especially the case with international firms operating in developing 
countries where the host government is dependent on the company for economic development in a 
crucial sector. This relationship gives the company some bargaining power that can be used to benefit the 
business or mitigate the effect of political risk (Brink, 2004:181). However, Jakobsen (2010:483) warns 
that the “obsolescing bargain mechanism” may increase a firms’ political risk exposure as a government 
may increase its leverage over the international firm once the firm has made large capital investments in 
15 
 
the host country, making it difficult for the firm to withdraw without severe losses (Jakobsen, 2010:483). 
With a gradual shift in the relative bargaining power of the firm, there can be a gradual shift of 
government intervention in the affairs of the international firm (Jakobsen, 2010:483). In this regard Alon 
and Herbert (2009:134) add that the host country may become less dependent on a company as the 
country acquires the skills on which the company previously had a monopoly, and this declining relative 
bargaining power may increase the company’s political risk exposure. 
As Chinese investors are latecomers in Africa, the contribution of a specific Chinese firm or a group of 
Chinese firms to the economy of a country is often small relative to Western investors. However, with 
increased investments this situation may change. Also, because of its latecomer status, Chinese firms 
often had to invest in countries where there were untapped opportunities (Kolstadt & Wigg, 2009:9). 
Opportunities were often found in countries where Western enterprises did not invest because of politics, 
poor infrastructure or less profitable situations, such as the oil industry in Sudan and the copper industry 
in Zambia. In these countries, Chinese firms are important in terms of their contribution to the economy, 
irrespective of being latecomers. This bargaining power may be illustrated by CNPC’s position in South 
Sudan. CNPC got a foothold in the Sudanese oil industry during the 1990s when most of the Western 
firms left because of pressure from their home governments and the imposition of sanctions against 
Sudan, after allegations of human rights abuses by the Bashir government. After the secession of South 
Sudan from Sudan in 2011, CNPC found itself in the position of being the largest investor in the South 
Sudanese oil industry, the main revenue source of South Sudan, since 75 per cent of the Sudanese oil 
operations were situated within the borders of the new country. Independence for South Sudan also 
meant an end of sanctions against that part of Sudan. CNPC ran the risk of losing their contracts to 
operate in the country, as the new government had anti-Chinese sentiments because of CNPC’s and 
China’s close relations with Khartoum during the civil war. Yet, CNPC’s contracts were renewed. One of 
the main reasons was the size of CNPC’s investment and South Sudan’s dependence, not only on the oil 
industry, but also on CNPC as the largest investor.  
Other than economic dependence on a company, the host country may also be in a situation of economic 
dependence on the home country of that enterprise in terms of foreign aid, loans, investments or trade. 
Alon and Herbert (2009:133) argue that this dependency on the home country may influence a firm’s 
relative bargaining power. As a rule of thumb: The more dependent the host country is on the home 
country, the lower the political risk exposure of the home country firm may be. China may contribute in 
different ways to African economies, not only in terms of investments and trade, but also by way of 
capital and aid in the form of non-conditional concessional loans from China’s state-owned banks. 
Concessional loans are medium and long-term, low interest rate credit extended by China Exim Bank 
under the designation of the Chinese government (Corkin, 2011:68). As a way of granting aid, China 
Exim Bank grants African countries concessional loans for development projects, with low interest rates 
and no conditions such as democracy, human rights or revenue transparency attached to the loans (ICG, 
2012:8). Chinese firms benefit from this arrangement as the contracts for the development projects 
financed by these loans have to be awarded to Chinese contractors (Corkin, 2011:71). Often the 
repayment of the loans is secured by raw materials from the African country (Corkin 2011:71). In this 
way, Beijing may assist SOEs to increase their investment prospects in Africa and at the same time obliges 
the firms to maintain close relations with the State Council and China Exim Bank (Holslag, 2011:4; Cissé, 
2012:1). Yeung and Liu (2008, cited in Corkin, 2011:75) call this system “economic diplomacy”, where 
interstate economic relations are conducted through the activities of national firms. Apart from profit and 
economic motives, political and diplomatic goals are met through these activities (Yeung & Liu, 2008, 
cited in Corkin, 2011:75). This network of interdependence may mitigate the effects of political risks that 
Chinese firms are exposed to. Construction firms may get access to new African markets and business 
opportunities and their risk of non-payment is reduced by the guarantee from the Chinese bank that can 
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pay the Chinese contractor in China. This also reduces the risk of currency volatility or problems with the 
repatriation of funds (Moreira, 2013).  
However, Wombolt and Mattout (2012) warn that this strategy of granting concessional loans for raw 
materials may expose Chinese firms to risks associated with too close connections with and dependence 
on government officials. They use the example of China Exim Bank that provided finance in 2008 to a 
copper mine and infrastructure projects in the DRC. Allegations in a parliamentary commission report of 
missing funds led to the restructuring of the deal, leaving the Chinese investors without any guarantee 
from the DRC government (Wombolt & Mattout, 2013). Further, although the Chinese investors were 
never implicated, the report was used in the presidential election campaign and reflected negatively on 
Chinese firms in general. Therefore, apart from the increased risks attached to the loans, this incident also 
influenced the public perception of Chinese firms and put the reputations of other Chinese firms at risk. 
Further, the access that African governments have to the Chinese loans may be used to the disadvantage 
of domestic firms such as banks, construction and resource extraction companies. This may contribute to 
reputational risk of Chinese firms because of possible anti-Chinese sentiment and pressure from local 
business.  
REPUTATIONAL RISK  
While African governments may welcome Chinese investments as a way of financing much needed 
development, the reputation of Chinese firms operating in Africa may influence their exposure to political 
risk. Gao (2009:107) argues that it is not only governments’ actions that may pose a political risk to firms, 
but other stakeholders can lobby to press governments to take action against international firms, such as 
labour unions, suppliers, competitors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In this regard the 
media may play a significant role in the reputational risk of firms where hostile publicity may affect public 
and government sentiments towards specific firms (Games, 2011). The reputation of Chinese firms may 
be influenced by firm culture, their approach to CSR, environmental concerns and labour issues.  
One of the factors that Alon and Herbert (2009:133) identify that may influence a firm’s political risk 
exposure is the situation where the firm and host country culture are fundamentally different. They use 
the example of Taiwanese firms that have lower political risks in China than US firms because of their 
similar culture, despite the political tensions between their governments. Chinese firms therefore may be 
exposed to higher political risks in Africa because of cultural differences. Shambaugh (2012) argues that 
one of the weaknesses of Chinese MNCs is that they still have their own national corporate culture and 
business practices and therefore firms still have a public image of being Chinese firms, rather than being 
multinational. Chinese firms have the reputation that they are not multilingual, especially on management 
level, that interpersonal relationships are more important than institutional relationships, and that they do 
not have a culture of transparency and corporate governance (Shambaugh, 2012). This public image may 
be altered as Chinese firms increasingly use mergers and acquisitions as a way of investing abroad, rather 
than greenfield investment. However, Shambaugh (2012) points out that mergers with foreign firms may 
still lead to cultural clashes within the firm and can lead to further operational difficulties.  
Apart from their cultural reputation, Chinese firms operating in Africa also have the reputation in many 
instances that they are not concerned with CSR, environmental issues and domestic labour practices. 
Alon and Herbert (2009:133) argue that discontent of citizens of the host country can be caused by 
factors such as environmental dumping or unethical behaviour. This discontent may lead to a negative 
public perception of the company with possible consequences of public reaction towards the company or 
political actions aimed at the company (Alon & Herbert, 2009:133). Although it seems that there are 
improvements in CSR in the policies of Chinese firms, Matisoff (2012) points out that the 
implementation of such policies are still a concern. For example, there are government institutes as well 
as departments within Chinese companies that study risks and corporate responsibility, but these 
institutes do not have decision-making powers, and their recommendations are not necessarily 
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implemented and integrated into the business operations (Matisoff, 2012). Matisoff’s (2012) study of 
CNPC’s CSR shows that the company lack in the areas of employing enough local workers, particularly in 
management positions, and their CSR strategy does not reflect international best practices with regards to 
environmental impact assessments, community involvement, public accountability and recognition of 
labour unions. The study finds that CNPC’s concept of CSR is not one of integrating CSR into business 
operations such as community involvement, but mainly focuses on compliance with laws and regulations, 
public relations and philanthropy (Matisoff, 2012). This reputation may expose Chinese firms to political 
risk, as community dissatisfaction, environmental concerns and poor labour practices may all lead to 
public protests and violence and Chinese firms may become targets in government actions. For example, 
bad publicity about Chinese labour practices in the Zambian copper industry played a huge role in the 
public debate around Chinese investments in this country, and this sentiment was used by Michael Sata 
during the 2011 Zambian presidential election (Lim, 2012). Further, in February 2013 the Zambian 
government cancelled the three licences held by a Chinese owned coal mine, Collum Coal Mining 
Industries, because of alleged labour rights abuses, in particular health and safety concerns, as well as a 
poor environmental record (BBC News, 2013). 
Political agendas of activists may be targeted towards a specific firm, but may also be targeted towards a 
country, for example by embargoes or regulations, as Alon and Herbert (2009:133) argue. As there is a  
perception that Chinese firms are different from multinational firms, Chinese businesses have the risk of 
being lumped together with other Chinese firms, even if they act independently. Consequently, poor 
labour or environmental practices by a particular Chinese firm may also influence the reputation of other 
firms or put them under scrutiny. The association of a firm with a specific country may therefore 
influence its reputation and consequently its political risk exposure. Mergers or acquisitions where firms 
or consortiums have a large local ownership may mitigate this risk, as the view of the host country public 
and government may be influenced by the perception that the business benefits the local economy or 
citizens (Alon & Herbert, 2009:135). 
HOME-HOST COUNTRY GOVERNMENT RELATIONS  
Because an international business firm may be associated with its home country, the home-host country 
government relations may influence the firm’s political risk exposure (Alon & Herbert, 2009:133). If this 
relationship is strained, the firm runs the risk of discriminatory treatment by the host country government 
(Alon & Herbert, 2009:133). While this relationship may have a negative impact on the one hand, the 
influence of the home country on the other hand may reduce a firm’s political risk exposure through 
international treaties, concessions and pacts that can safeguard against some aspects of risk, for example 
by pressure from the home government to withhold aid (Sethi & Luther, 1986:63). 
Chinese firms may therefore benefit from international treaties and diplomatic and economic relations 
between China and the African host country. Moreira (2013) argues that the Chinese government can use 
its diplomatic and economic influence to promote good relations between the host government and the 
Chinese investors. This may mitigate their exposure to unstable political environments in Africa. 
However, strained relations may on the other hand expose Chinese firms to adverse government action.  
The expansion of China’s economic interest in Africa encouraged China to create a platform for African 
and Chinese policymakers to enhance their relations and develop economic co-operation and trade, the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The first FOCAC ministerial meeting took place in 
Beijing in 2000 (Cissé, 2012:1). During this first meeting Beijing offered African countries a unique 
economic, political and security package that included debt relief, peacekeeping, cheap loans, support in 
multilateral forums, military deals and South-South co-operation (Jacobs, 2011:29). Sino-African relations 
were strengthened further in 2006 with the publishing of the China Africa Policy paper, as well as having 
a full FOCAC III China-Africa heads of state or government summit in Beijing (Grimm, 2012:2). Cissé 
(2012:2) comments that FOCAC has played a major role in facilitating Chinese investments in Africa by 
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enhancing business relations between Chinese companies and African countries. In formal China-Africa 
relations and FOCAC policies, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries 
is one of the principles that is declared to guide the Sino-African relations (FOCAC, 2000; MFA, 2006). 
This principle manifested in Beijing’s claim that its assistance to and economic dealings with African 
countries are free of political conditions such as human rights, good governance or democracy (Jacobs, 
2011:30). Alden and Hughes (2009:572) argue that the policy of non-interference and non-conditionality 
has initially benefited Chinese investors over their Western counterparts to obtain access to African 
resources. For example, CNPC invested in Sudan at the time when the country had a civil war and 
Western firms left the country because of home government pressure and sanctions.  
Despite the official doctrine, Kuo (2012b:3) remarks that it is not always possible for the Chinese 
government to uphold this policy in practice due to the extent of Chinese business interests in Africa, 
Western pressure and expectations by African countries. Alden and Hughes (2009:572) further explain 
that the Chinese government cannot remain indifferent to the politics of a host country because of the 
complex situation created by the diversity of Chinese actors involved in African investments. Barber and 
Xiao (2012:6) remark that “Chinese interests become ever more entrenched and consequently caught up 
in Africa’s domestic and regional politics” despite Chinese official rhetoric of “non-interference” in the 
internal affairs of other countries. Saferworld (2011) argues that China may have an indirect influence on 
the internal affairs of many African countries by way of diplomatic and economic relations as well as in 
military cooperation and arms trade. This may contribute to the association of China and Chinese firms 
with certain groups, usually the ruling elite (Saferworld, 2011). Although this may be an advantage for 
companies, this association may put these firms at risk in cases of conflict and subsequent regime change 
when former rebel groups or the opposition party come into power. For example, in Sudan, China’s 
government and Chinese firms were associated with the Khartoum regime during the civil war. Because 
of Chinese oil investments, the Khartoum government could finance and therefore prolong the war 
against the South. Because of the Southern perception of close co-operation between China and 
Khartoum, Chinese investments were at risk of being targeted by the South Sudanese government when 
South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011, and most of China’s investments fell into South Sudanese 
territory.  
Somewhat consequently, the Chinese government is increasingly involved in diplomatic relations as well 
as peacekeeping missions in African countries, irrespective of China’s official policy still being one of 
non-interference. China’s engagement with peacekeeping missions may contribute to peace on the 
country, and its association with the AU may also add to China’s image in Africa as a responsible power 
sensitive to African security (Saferworld, 2011). This image of China as a responsible power and the 
association of Chinese firms with its home country may contribute to lower levels of reputational risk for 
the Chinese investors on the continent, provided that rebel groups do not explicitly target the AU and its 
institutions.  
3. CONCLUSION 
The nature of political risk is complex and multi-dimensional in an integrated world economy where 
MNCs from not only developed but also from developing countries, increasingly invest in operations 
situated in foreign countries. This is evident from the expansion of the presence of Chinese business 
operations on the African continent, where the political environment often exposes the firms to high 
political risk. Security and profitability objectives are becoming more relevant for Chinese firms as they 
operate in these high-risk regions, and political risk analysis is increasingly important as a way of assessing 
and addressing the issue of political risk. When assessing political risk in Africa, Chinese firms should 
firstly consider factors that may influence the African political environment, such as economic 
development, social development, political instability, corruption and political violence in the host 
country.  
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Company-specific factors may have a negative or positive impact on the exposure of Chinese firms to the 
host country political risk environment. Six aspects are particularly relevant in the consideration of 
political risks:  
Firstly, the size, ownership and the relationship of the firm with the home government may influence a 
firm’s bargaining power in a host country. Large and diversified firms generally have more bargaining 
power than small firms, and Chinese SOEs, especially those in strategic sectors, have more support from 
the Chinese government in terms of diplomacy and finance.  
Secondly, company resources such as capital, experience and technical expertise may give a firm a 
competitive advantage over other firms, especially when the host country lack in these areas. Chinese 
firms may lack experience in operating globally, but because of their access to capital, this deficiency may 
be overcome by the increased use of mergers and acquisitions as the mode of entry for business firms 
into foreign countries.  
Thirdly, the political behaviour of firms such as partnership formation with the government may be 
beneficial to business operations. However, in politically unstable countries this may pose a risk to 
Chinese firms of being targeted or losing contracts in cases of regime change. Also, in countries with 
democratic systems, governments change periodically. Today’s opposition might be tomorrow’s 
government and the approach will have to be adequately adjusted.  
Fourthly, the more the country is economically dependent on the firm or the home country, the more 
bargaining power the firm has and government intervention is less likely. African countries may become 
more and more economically dependent on China as China-African trade relations are growing and 
Chinese concessional loans become more relevant to African countries.  
A fifth factor to be considered is the company’s reputational risk that may be influenced by company 
culture, its response to CSR, environmental concerns and labour issues. Chinese firms generally have the 
reputation of having a more top-heavy, very hierarchical business culture and not integrating CSR, 
environmental concerns and labour issues into their business operations. This reputation, if not 
successfully countered, may put Chinese firms at risk of being targeted in different ways by governments, 
the public and activist groups.  
Lastly, because an international business firm may be associated with its home country, the home-host 
country government relations may influence the firm’s political risk exposure. Ultimately, reputation 
damage can be inflicted on all companies, relating to perceived nationality. While this association may 
have negative consequences for Chinese firms in some cases, China’s increasing involvement in African 
diplomatic relations, peacekeeping missions and association with the AU may add to China’s image in 
Africa as a responsible power sensitive to African security.  
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